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however, to do something well we must employ an 
altogether different, internal measuring technique, 
which we denote as ‘the way’ we do things, relying 
on a rhythm, a pace, a course or a fluency while 
still incorporating those causes and ends. In doing 
something well, the cause, the end and the way of 
doing something are so intricately intertwined that 
we cannot separate them without destroying the 
effect of each on the whole. 
Every single day, we find ourselves driven by a 
massive range of motives: we can do things out of 
sheer playfulness and relaxation, or spurred by a 
sense of moral duty, or as is more often the case, 
motivated by compensation, forced by physical 
necessity, or driven by hidden psychological desires 
or needs. And though all these variations – the 
spontaneity of play, the burden of duty, the effort 
of work, the necessity of nature – will play a promi-
nent role in our analysis, none can tell us how to 
enact them as never before. This is undoubtedly an 
awkward statement, since it paradoxically implies 
that we have done that act a thousand times before 
and this time could be the best instance of it. We 
need to be cautious here: though such a process 
of instantiation singles out an act as unique, it does 
not necessarily mean we are looking for excel-
lence. While excellence is continuous with a form 
of striving, that is not in itself its purpose. Doing-well 
or living-well does not involve a need for perfec-
tion. In its constant dealings with obstacles, it can 
never take form in a purified state; its constituent 
parts are always diverse and full of contrasts. What 
How do we live well? If there is one fundamental 
question that constantly occupies our minds, it 
is probably this one. There have been about a 
million different answers, half of which have come 
from religion and almost the same number from 
philosophy, not forgetting the multitude of aesthetic, 
psychological, therapeutic, hedonistic, practical and 
pragmatic answers. Too many answers, appearing 
in every possible combination. Taking out the last 
word and reducing the question to ‘How do we live?’ 
would make it infinitely easier to answer and would 
undoubtedly involve the bare cataloguing of all the 
necessities of the various domains. None of them 
would offer any clue whatsoever to what ‘well’ might 
mean – its definition can never be provided by a 
domain as such. Yet without exception, we apply 
the word to everything we do. We can drive a car 
and drive it well; we can cook a six-course meal and 
cook it well; we can lead a company and lead it well; 
we can take care of a difficult problem and do it well; 
we can run a marathon and run it well. We can do 
ordinary things extraordinarily, and extraordinary 
things far less well – either way. And when we have 
done something well, we can be fairly certain that 
next time we will probably be unable to repeat the 
act. There are no manuals for doing things well, as 
there are for doing things right. Taken literally, doing 
something right means doing it measured against 
an external standard, a ruler, a straight line divided 
up into proper increments telling us what is too little 
and what is too much. Certainly, there exist powerful 
external reasons for doing things, both causes and 
ends. We might be doing things ‘because’ or ‘for’; 
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8stands by itself, and stands out as a figure that has 
been released from its origin rather than remaining 
attached to it. Doing something well, then, would be 
better described as a lessening of control than as 
an increase in it: a letting-go and a letting-happen 
more than a making-happen. Later on, we will have 
an opportunity to study examples of people who 
felt less present as events unfolded, especially in 
cases when things were going well – and the latter 
expression speaks for itself, suggesting that when 
one is doing well, things are too. In this sense, the 
figure of the turn should be perceived as a thing, 
and shelving it automatically under the category of 
motion, gesture or action will not suffice. In its figu-
rative mode, the turn is not so much a movement 
between objects as it is the turning of movement 
into an object and, conversely, the turning of an 
object into movement – a reciprocal, symmetrical 
formula that will emerge as our central thesis.
Before our discourse starts to sound like an embar-
rassing misconception of quantum mechanics, we 
should hasten to point out that this fundamental 
vagueness of object and act has a history going far 
more deeply back in time than anything modern. 
In fact, its history winds through so many different 
periods that we cannot say exactly where and when 
it started – thousands of years ago, at least. From 
the perspectives of numerous disciplines, including 
anthropology, sociology, theology and aesthetics, 
the notion of doing well has been denominated 
as grace, a deviously complex term with linkages 
to gratitude, gracefulness and gratification as well 
as favour, pleasure, beauty and much more. The 
briefest way of defining grace would be to say it is 
movement that exceeds its agent, though admit-
tedly such a cryptic definition calls for extensive 
elaboration. Grace is in many ways such an elusive 
concept that in each of the abovementioned disci-
plines it carries a completely different meaning. One 
explains it as an efficiency of mobility, another as an 
infinite power of transcendence, still others as mere 
good manners, and some as acquired customs and 
we do and the way we do it might diverge. To do 
something well, we must often act against the very 
nature of the action, similarly to the technique of 
counterpoint in music. For instance, to play well, we 
should not act as if we are doodling; on the contrary, 
we should take the game completely seriously or 
else there is nothing at stake. As they say in foot-
ball, it’s life or death. And conversely, we can only 
do our duty as if we are playing tennis, since we 
would completely fail at a difficult task when doing it 
strenuously. Likewise, we can only do our work well 
if we find relaxation in it, and attend to necessities 
as if they sprout from freedom. How often do we 
not follow our desires as if they are our own ideas? 
Doing something well, then, means giving things 
a twist or a turn – the form action takes when we 
do several things at the same time. When driving 
well, we manoeuvre smoothly between slow- and 
fast-moving traffic, accommodate the behaviour of 
others, and operate without making abrupt changes. 
And when cooking that six-course meal, we time the 
preparation of one course to occur while the other is 
simmering on the stove and a third has been baking 
in the oven for hours. In these realms of action, the 
notion of turning and twisting can be interpreted 
quite literally, as actual curves left behind by a body 
moving in space. But the turn goes beyond mere 
pliancy and flexibility.
When we turn play into seriousness, or duty into 
ease, the turn is figurative, not literal. This concept 
of the turn goes much further than curvature and 
smooth movement between edgy obstacles, and 
undoubtedly further than a naïve opposition to the 
straightness of doing things right. It is made up of 
motion and activity, naturally, yet the movement in 
itself does not follow the way things take a turn. 
Our concrete movements are fed by a motion that 
is both larger and more abstract. The turn is larger 
than its agent. It is as much born out of a situation 
as it is initiated by an individual, and it is as much 
a figurative movement as it is concrete. In fact, it 
would be more correct to say the figure of the turn 
9however, are by no means terms that should be 
associated only with monotheism; we encounter 
them in at least as fundamental a form in a period 
when a myriad of gods populated the heavens, 
namely in ancient Greece.1
At that time, grace was denoted with the Greek 
word charis (pronounced with a fricative ‘h’, as in 
the German Bach), and the concept played a central 
role in politics, love, friendship, competition and 
battle as well as religion. It is a word we encounter in 
many forms in the epic poems of Homer, Pindar and 
Hesiod, and in the hundreds of written works that 
constitute the classics. Today, we still find charis in 
words like ‘charity’ and charisma’, to name just two 
derivations. Yet to properly understand the concept 
of charis, we will have to expand our study even 
further and go beyond that of the ancient Greeks, 
since charis is deeply rooted in gift culture, which in 
turn precedes Greek history by thousands of years. 
And it is not exactly clear – nor, perhaps, that rele-
vant for our purposes – whether those roots lie in the 
Indus valley, in Minoan Crete or with the nomadic 
tribes living north of ancient Greece; probably in 
all three. Of course, gift cultures were and still are 
spread all over the planet, with the gift constituting a 
fundamental form of exchange in which aesthetics, 
sociology, economy and religion are undifferenti-
ated. We will not be going into all the intricacies of 
gift exchange; what matters for our discussion is 
that charis conceptually originates in gift exchange, 
and that we will only be able to properly grasp the 
meaning of grace once we understand the gift. 
The English word ‘grace’ is derived from the Latin 
translation of charis, gratia, and we encounter it in 
various forms related to gift culture: for instance, 
as ‘gratitude’, or thankfulness; ‘gratification’, the 
pleasure of receiving; and ‘graciousness’, a form 
of giving. In commentaries it is usually explained 
that charis is derived from the old Greek word for 
pleasure, chara.2 Such a connection would start to 
explain not only why the exchange of goods as we 
habits. It is all of these and none. Grace is both the 
quality of the act and the movement that carries that 
act: in other words, it is both of and beyond the indi-
vidual, anchored as well as unanchored, immanent 
as well as transcendent. How can this be? Certainly, 
for that reason it might seem a troublesome term for 
some, but studied more closely, the history of grace 
will not only prove comprehensive, but will demon-
strate to be especially illuminating when viewed as 
a conceptual history. The further back we go, the 
more it will adjust later notions of itself. And though 
it has as many religious connotations as well as 
aesthetic, moral and social ones, this history will 
show that none of these domains is able to concep-
tually claim the ground on which we can explain the 
effects on the others. 
Grace and gift
Nonreligious readers will quickly associate the 
term ‘grace’ with gracefulness, an aesthetic term 
that seems to originate in a bygone age when 
elegance and convoluted formalities regulated 
public behaviour, or when now-forgotten treatises 
on sculpture emphasised tentative gestures and 
a soft expression of the flesh. Religious readers, 
on the other hand, will immediately recall the 
singing of ‘Amazing Grace’ or recognise the term 
from Sunday-school discussions of sufficient and 
efficient grace, signifying the ultimate source of 
generosity and goodness. However, neither the 
wholly aesthetic nor the solely religious, even in its 
social or moral guise, can claim the powers of grace 
for itself. Actually, things are far more confounded: 
all these neatly distinguished domains of human 
endeavour become more and more inextricably tied 
up with one another the further back we trace the 
term’s history. It would be impossible to understand 
the Judeo-Christian enterprise of institutionalising a 
superhuman grace without acknowledging that the 
idea has aesthetics at its core. And, conversely, it 
is as impossible to accept the aesthetics of grace 
without understanding it as involving at least some 
form of transcendence. Generosity and goodness, 
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answers he subsequently offers – has occupied 
and often troubled scholars of anthropology: ‘What 
rule of legality and self-interest, in societies of 
a backward or archaic type, compels the gift that 
has been received to be obligatorily reciprocated? 
What power resides in the object given that causes 
its recipient to pay it back?’3 We would probably 
formulate the question somewhat differently and 
more subtly; be that as it may, what matters is that 
(a) Mauss makes it categorically clear that the gift 
is never free:4 every gift needs to be reciprocated 
in whatever form; and (b) that he locates the obli-
gation to return not in mechanisms of the social or 
economic but in the ‘force of things’.5 In the Maori 
gift culture on which Mauss based his studies, this 
power is identified as the hau, often translated as 
the ‘spirit of the gift’.6 It is the hau in particular that 
makes gift-giving into a cyclical activity, not merely 
an oscillation between a giver and a receiver but 
making the receiver transform into a returning agent. 
Therefore, we should always keep in mind that gift 
exchange is structured according to three stages, 
not two agents, as our dualistic models of informa-
tion exchange and communication prescribe. What 
exactly, then, is this power, which he calls the ‘force 
of things’? For almost a century, this has posed 
serious problems in anthropology. Some have vehe-
mently denied its existence;7 others have developed 
variations or allowed asymmetries and unilateral-
isms;8 and still others have categorised it as a form 
of ‘personhood’, an animist notion9 in which the 
donor’s personality – somehow – remains in the 
given object, causing it inevitably to return to its 
source. After the social and economic models, this 
adds a psychological explanation for gift-giving. 
 However, all theories offering secondary expla-
nations are bound to fail. After our initial explorations 
of the turn and grace, we might be able to offer a 
simpler solution. When object and act are inextri-
cably entwined, the act of giving an object becomes 
the same as that object giving itself. Though this is 
find it in tribal gift cultures cannot be unambiguously 
forced into social or economic models but also, and 
more importantly, why it took on the chiefly aesthetic 
connotations charis had in ancient Greece. The 
social as a concept, of course, is an eighteenth-
century invention based on the contrat social and 
did not exist in the time of Homer. It would be a 
grave error to think all forms of togetherness were 
made of the same substance as the social. Similarly, 
it would be a mistake to confuse gift exchange with 
our notion of an economy, of exchange based on 
immediacy: we pay for things, be it entered on the 
side of debit or credit. Graciousness and gratitude 
are not part of its exchange values. The art of gift 
exchange is based on a subtle delaying of recipro-
cation, on the increase of esteem, on the sometimes 
overwhelming forms of repayment and the equally 
overwhelming forms of giving that we find in the 
tribal custom of the potlatch. If there is pleasure in 
the exchange of gifts, it is never what we – in the 
West, after Freud – would call pleasure: the satis-
faction of the senses as related to an economy of 
the self. As the expression has it, we ‘take pleasure’ 
in something, and such taken pleasure is radically 
different from given and returned pleasure, therefore 
leaving a massive debt on the side of the subject. 
In Freud’s language, Schuld means debt as well as 
guilt. In contrast, the gratifying pleasure of charis 
is as much a pleasure of giving as of receiving and 
returning – that is, of going beyond the self. It is 
pleasure, yes, but not your pleasure; you can’t truly 
own it, since in the gift cycle charis is always being 
passed on. What we call objects and subjects are 
mere stations in the circulation of grace. And this 
is the main reason why any explanation of charis 
based on the standard objectivist or subjectivist 
theories of aesthetics is necessarily flawed.
To fully understand the circular nature of the 
gift, we must briefly turn to Marcel Mauss’s indis-
pensable 1924 book The Gift, which begins with 
a startling question, one that – along with the 
11
by the goddess Athena, while ‘from his head she 
made the locks flow in curls like the hyacinth 
flower’14 – every variety of grace is denoted by that 
same word: charis. And countless other examples 
with different connotations can be found.15 After all 
these centuries, it remains astounding to see that a 
word meaning favour, generosity, gratitude, enjoy-
ment, recompense or even literally payment can 
directly connote the swinging of earrings and the 
curling of locks of hair. But charis lies at the heart of 
a world that does not discriminate between actions 
and things: things act, and actions present them-
selves as things. The ancient Greeks would laugh 
at us with our miserable division between ethics 
and aesthetics. Who are we to subjectify pleasure 
and isolate it from gratitude and giving? Who are we 
to view activity as purely a means to an end? The 
act moves through the end, and the way of acting 
is itself an object, making the act something larger 
than intention or actuality – in fact, making it super-
actual, since it embodies a surplus of action, not a 
single deed.16 Instead of viewing these overarching 
concepts as representing a primitive stage of confu-
sion, we should acknowledge them as advanced, 
resolving the nagging dualism of thing and action 
by a circular logic – a logic clearly manifested in the 
tripartite structure of gift exchange.
Mauss firmly grounds gift culture in the notion 
of what he terms ‘the three obligations: giving, 
receiving and returning’.17 And even though he uses 
words like ‘grateful’ and ‘gratitude’, he surprisingly 
disregards their evolution into cultures of grace 
and even explicitly refuses to ‘take into account the 
aesthetic phenomena’ related to the gift.18 In this 
respect, what the ancient Greeks offer us points 
resolutely in the opposite direction of Mauss’s 
thesis: charis signifies each of the three stages of 
gift exchange, the cycle itself, as well as its intrinsic 
connection to aesthetics. As a matter of fact, the 
conflation of those meanings led to charis being 
personified by three goddesses, the Charites, or in 
a rather abstract formulation, we recognise it from 
art: we never know if the effect a work has on us is 
equal to what the artist effectuated. And it is no acci-
dent that this example is derived from aesthetics. 
In other words, we will never be able to fully distin-
guish between what an object does to us and what 
is done to it. The vector of the action proceeds 
through the object without changing, without any 
real before or after, that is, without origin or end. 
Things are ‘leaf-shaped’, as Goethe would say, 
pointing both backward and forward in time. The 
act of giving turns into the object, slipping through 
to turn into the act of reception, and when giving 
becomes receiving, the reverse logically follows, 
closing the circle. Circularity is a matter of logic 
before it can be understood socially, economically 
or psychologically. The feelings of esteem (of the 
donor), pleasure (of the receiver) and gratitude (of 
the returner) that accompany gift-giving necessarily 
follow from the vicious circle in which the act bites 
the tail of the object.
The richness of feeling related to the gift cycle 
in cases of charis can be relatively easily uncov-
ered by tracing the word’s use in the classics, 
and especially its early use by Homer. The word 
appears in so many different contexts that trans-
lators of the Odyssey and the Iliad have found it 
excruciatingly difficult to match its meanings in 
their own modern languages. There is Achilles’s 
persistent anger in the Iliad, stirred by his assump-
tion that he has been insufficiently compensated 
by King Agamemnon for ‘tirelessly fighting the 
enemy’;10 Poseidon’s questioning of the generosity 
of Odysseus, who offered the ‘ships of the Argives’11 
in the Odyssey; the lack of gratitude shown by the 
suitors of Penelope, Odysseus’ wife, left behind on 
Ithaca;12 and moreover, the description of Hera’s 
charm after she puts on earrings with ‘three berry-
like drops’,13 which is similar to the description of the 
charisma of Odysseus, who, after anointing himself 
with oil, is ‘made taller to look upon and mightier’ 
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of the Graces to their actual positions in the gift 
cycle.24 This observation could scarcely be of 
greater significance. As a rule, tribal gift exchange 
as we encounter it in Mauss concerns the exchange 
of actual goods, yet in its Greek form, represented 
by the Charites, the emphasis shifts to the feel-
ings that accompany such exchanges. And, even 
more significantly for our argument, it opens up the 
radical possibility that feelings, things and acts can 
be exchanged with one another; that feelings can 
reciprocate gifts of objects, and objects can recipro-
cate graciousness. The moment goods take on the 
form of the good or the beneficial, the beneficial can 
free itself from material goods. 
Of the three goddesses, Aglaea plays the leading 
role, one that is slightly more abstract, being closely 
related to the radiance of Aphrodite or even Apollo, 
in whom the act of giving is expressed by the shining 
sunbeams he wears as a spiked halo on his head, 
sunbeams that we recognise from the depictions 
of the Egyptian sungod Aten which end in stylised, 
open hands – a clear indication of the gift.25 In this 
sense, Aglaea assumes the role of beauty that initi-
ates a cyclical process of grace: a stage in which the 
object radiates movement. Euphrosyne personifies 
the reception of the gift in the form of joy. The few 
existing images show her drinking wine, and when 
we recall the prominence of springs in the rites of 
Orchomenus, we realise that she literally ‘takes in’ 
the gift. The gift is not just swallowed by Euphrosyne 
but wholly incorporated and internalised, which is 
why, of the three goddesses, this stage is asso-
ciated most strongly with feeling. Thirdly, Thalia 
shows that the taking in of beauty does not stop with 
pleasure, as in the standard view of the last 300 
years of aesthetic theory, but necessarily leads to a 
transformation, to blooming and flourishing. As an 
image of youth, Thalia personifies renewal, growth 
and prosperity; in becoming radiant herself, she 
assumes the role of Aglaea. The British classical 
scholar Jane Harrison characterised the Graces as 
their Latinised designation, the Graces or the Three 
Graces. In the Iliad, where the divinities are not fully 
crystallised yet, Homer uses two different versions 
of the word charis, one capitalised and the other 
not. So far, we have only been looking at instances 
of the latter. Capitalised, the word functions as the 
name of one who in Homer’s time was still a single 
goddess: Charis, ‘wife to the far-famed lame god’, 
Hephaestus, the builder of automatons.19 In the 
Odyssey, this single goddess has transformed into 
Aphrodite, the goddess of love and beauty, who 
hardly ever meets anyone without being prepared 
or accompanied by the Charites.20 Hesiod, the 
Homeric poet from Orchomenus, is the first to iden-
tify the Charites by their names: ‘Eurynome, the 
daughter of Ocean, beautiful in form, bore him three 
fair-cheeked Charites, Aglaea, and Euphrosyne, 
and lovely Thalia, from whose eyes as they glanced 
flowed love that unnerves the limbs: and beautiful is 
their glance beneath their brows.’21 The cult of the 
Charites originated from the same city, Orchomenus 
in Boeotia, of which Pausanias said that its king 
Eteocles ‘was the first man to sacrifice to the 
Graces’, represented by three rocks that fell from 
heaven, luckily in front of the king’s feet.22 During 
that archaic period, the Charites were worshipped 
in Boeotia as spring goddesses, a clear reference 
to ideas of generosity and nourishing, as well as 
to the fact that grace was invariably ‘poured over’ 
mortals by the gods, while the pairing of stone and 
water corresponds to the intertwinement of object 
and movement.23
A closer look at the names of the Charites – Aglaea, 
Euphrosyne, Thalia – reveals more about how they 
relate to Mauss’s three obligations. Aglaea, which 
means ‘radiance’ or ‘shining’, is the figure of giving; 
Euphrosyne, meaning ‘joy’ or ‘good cheer’, the 
figure of receiving; and Thalia, meaning ‘bloom’ 
or ‘flourishing’, the figure of thanking and grati-
tude. According to Seneca, the Stoic philosopher 
Chrysippus was the first to connect the names 
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(C) holds the hands or shoulders of the other two.28 
These hands are closing the circle, while the two 
remaining hands hold the necessary attributes. 
Again, it is the Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca 
who connects their going hand in hand to the gift 
cycle, with ‘one who bestows the benefit, one who 
receives it, and a third who returns it’.29 This is 
the round schema we recognise from Primavera, 
the acclaimed painting by Sandro Botticelli, and 
the life-size statue The Three Graces by Antonio 
Canova, which we can walk around because of the 
unimpaired three-dimensionality of the figures and 
the configuration as a whole: a circular structure 
in which all limbs and digits – legs, arms, hands, 
fingers – are engaged in creating a single model 
of grace. The Charites function as one and three 
simultaneously. In the cyclical system of the round 
dance, the triad of three goddesses, similar to other 
‘maiden-trinities’ such as the Horae (seasons) 
and Moirae (fates), accompany and guide events 
as recurrent, not as part of a linear, progressive 
timeline.30 Yes, things change, but only according 
to rhythms and cycles. In mythology, these triads 
invariably operate in a covert manner, staying in 
the background where they can influence others 
without directly intervening themselves. The power 
of these women triads lies in their acting indirectly, 
never as protagonists of the story, and always as 
maidens, i.e., unattached. They act in stages, with 
things moving incrementally toward an end, and 
they act recurrently, with all their actions repeated, 
either over short, daily periods or very long time 
spans such as the seasons or the cycle of life and 
death. 
We encounter the same ambiguity between one 
and three, as well as between object and move-
ment, in the Charites’ strange relationships with 
other gods, Aphrodite in particular. The Charites are 
three figures, and Aphrodite one, but Aphrodite is 
constantly attended by the three, and the three act 
the ‘givers of all increase’; the cycle adds one act to 
the next, and then to the next; they keep multiplying 
each other’s effects.26 In the cycle of grace, things 
keep turning. Viewed as round dancers, the Graces 
in fact change positions: giving becomes receiving, 
receiving becomes returning, and returning giving, 
one transforming into another. 
Ancient iconography depicts the Graces without 
exception as dancing figures. Not coincidentally, 
the name of the city Orchomenus has the same 
etymological root as the word ‘orchestra’, meaning 
‘dance floor’.27 On bas-reliefs from the Archaic 
period, the Charites are initially clothed and line up 
single file, strictly aligned, all looking in the same 
direction. They hold hands, grasping their attrib-
utes in their free hands – usually a piece of fruit, 
a garland, or a flower. Over time, we observe an 
increasing variety in the way they hold hands, 
while the expression of dancing becomes more 
prominent. In ancient Greece, dancing was a 
collective activity, with dancers moving in geomet-
rical patterns, as in the round dance. While the 
Charites are mostly shown smiling and looking in 
various directions, they still line up, with one hand 
engaged in linking and the other hanging down. It is 
not until the later Hellenistic period that we see the 
circular configuration emerging. The figures were 
increasingly depicted nude, and though the figures 
became more three-dimensional, the sculptures as 
a whole remained flat and linear, though they were 
intended to represent a round dance. This paradox 
was solved with an ingenious invention: the middle 
figure was turned around so that her back faced the 
viewer. It makes all the difference. Since most sculp-
tures were positioned against a wall and still acted 
as reliefs perceived in frontal view, they resembled 
the archaic A-B-C lineup, but looking closely at who 
holds who in the new configuration, we discover an 
A-C-B pattern: a circular organisation in which the 
figure on the left (A) holds hands with the figure on 
the right (B), while the turned figure in the middle 
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combination, interdependence and interpenetra-
tion of standing still and moving around can do that. 
Both works of art have found their own way to what 
we have been calling the figure – or what we should 
perhaps term figuration – Botticelli via the abstrac-
tion of lines, Canova through that of posture, the 
figure being that strange entity occupying the gap 
between the abstract and the concrete, force and 
form, or, to use the terms we have used since the 
start of this essay, movement and object. Botticelli 
and Canova have found solutions that allow us to 
view Venus and the Graces as intricately overlap-
ping, or, more precisely, as modifying each other 
contrapuntally, one taking on the ways of the other. 
The graceful acts as an object, and the beautiful 
object radiates movement. 
What, then, is the actual difference between 
beauty and grace? They are deeply interrelated but 
categorically different, and we should make every 
possible effort not to make a muddle of their complex 
relationship. In the descriptions above – the dance 
of three figures becoming one circular configuration, 
the progression of time returning to its starting point, 
and the Three Graces being attendants to a single 
Venus – we see a very special form of their role-
switching that directly involves a reversal of object 
and movement. In his 1793 treatise ‘On Grace and 
Dignity’ (Über Anmut und Würde), Friedrich Schiller 
tries to solve the riddle: ‘The Greeks still maintained 
a distinction, then, between grace, or the Graces, 
and beauty, since they attached attributes to them 
that do not apply to the goddess of beauty.’34 Then, 
on the next page, he rigorously spells out his defini-
tion of how the two should be distinguished:
Grace is a movable beauty [Anmut ist eine beweg-
liche Schönheit], a beauty that can appear in a subject 
by chance and disappear in the same way. In this it 
distinguishes itself from static beauty (fixe Schönheit), 
which is necessarily granted along with the subject 
itself.”35 
as one: their cycle is closed, and they dance as one. 
That Homer capitalised Charis’s name in the Iliad 
was certainly no accident, nor was his confusion 
of her with Aphrodite in the Odyssey. The Romans 
translated charis as venus as often as they trans-
lated it as gratia, emphasises Karl Kerenyi, who 
likens the Charites to ‘a sort of threefold Aphrodite’.31 
There are numerous episodes in which the Charites 
accompany Aphrodite, weave an ‘ambrosial robe’32 
for her, anoint her with ‘immortal oil’,33 or assist her 
in a prolonged bathing ritual. Despite all the ambi-
guity, the myths still present us with a single Venus 
and a triad of Graces (here we switch from Greek to 
Roman denominations), a distinction made manifest 
in Botticelli’s Primavera, in which Venus approaches 
us frontally, and the Graces dance with each other. 
Venus, in the orientation of her gestures and her 
gaze, engages with us, while the Graces, with their 
glancing eyes and entwined fingers, are wholly 
absorbed in each other. Such iconography shows 
how Venus initiates events, and how the Graces, 
like the Horae and the Moirae, influence the course 
of events: a subtle distinction that is consistent with 
the majority of depictions. Fortunately, Botticelli does 
not even make the slightest attempt to portray them 
as actually dancing; he is much more interested in 
the interlacing of the fingers and hands – one pair 
of entwined hands high up, the other at eye level 
and one down below – than in the positioning of the 
legs and feet. 
The Italian sculptor Canova appears to be even 
less interested in portraying the Graces as dancing 
in his large sculpture of them. In marble, it would 
surely look ridiculous; as the word denotes, a statue 
stands. In all the swirling of gestures, of bent arms 
and bent legs, standing remains the essential 
problem of premodern sculpture; the physical ques-
tion of how to stand must be answered in the statue’s 
conceptualisation. This is absolutely crucial. A mere 
representational depiction of a ‘graceful’ movement 
would never reveal the powers of grace; only the 
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manoeuvre by placing grace in between pure move-
ment and pure stillness, not via ambiguity, paradox, 
mediation or superposition – some of the terms we 
have used so far – but through the figure of coun-
terpoint. In doing so, he was solving the enormous 
problems Kant had created by separating morality 
from aesthetics, which for Schiller had been the main 
incentive to write ‘On Grace and Dignity’. Viewed 
from this perspective, the German poet-philosopher 
was trying to repair the intricate connections grace 
and gravity had shared in the Greek perception of 
charis. And for us, charis offers the main conceptual 
framework for understanding grace in its relation 
to beauty. Why, then, if grace can claim stillness, 
should beauty not be able to claim movement? The 
rule of the turn can be applied in both directions. 
Schiller would only have had to adopt the same 
technique for solving a paradox by using the adjec-
tive turn of the substantive.
With such a reversal, a formula for beauty 
emerges that was in fact concocted by Henri 
Bergson in 1904: ‘Beauty … is arrested grace’.39 
Beauty, then, is not on one side of the equation, 
identified with the fixity of the object, but rather 
occupies the same middle position as grace, while 
operating the other way around. Beauty is an object 
that acts like it is moving. Or, in a terminology used 
earlier, it is a still object that radiates movement – a 
formula that fits the towardness of Venus and the 
halo of Apollo as much as it does the shining of 
Aglaea. Although beauty is not the principal subject, 
we should mention that radiance is a concept that 
is as crucial to an understanding of ancient Greece 
as is charis.40 It explains why Homer confused 
Charis with Aphrodite, and why words such as 
‘glowing’, ‘shining’, and ‘gleaming’ flood the pages 
of the epic poems. It explains the Greeks’ obses-
sion with anointment, Odysseus’s shining locks of 
hair, the endless combing and bathing, the gold on 
Achilles’s shield, the fluting of marble columns, the 
polychrome paint on the same marble, and the gold 
It is the perfect formula. Edmund Burke’s defini-
tion in A Philosophical Enquiry, which contains 
only a single, short paragraph dedicated to grace, 
is similarly structured but falls short in its concep-
tual depth: ‘Gracefulness is an idea belonging to 
posture and motion.’36 Burke identifies the same 
problem as Schiller: that grace should be viewed 
both as posture, i.e., standing still, and as motion; 
however, he accomplishes very little with the neutral 
conjunction ‘and’. In merely adding stillness to 
movement, he fails to synthesise the two. Schiller, 
however, does exactly that. By contrasting the 
adjective ‘movable’ with the substantive ‘beauty’, he 
applies the ‘rule of the turn’ we formulated at the 
beginning of the essay, and more precisely in the 
previous paragraph: to make what we do and the 
way we do it – i.e., what and how – contrapuntal to 
one another. As a consequence, grace cannot be 
simply equated with movement or ease of move-
ment, as, for instance, Paul Souriau and Herbert 
Spencer did.37 Theirs concerns the beauty of 
motion, Schiller’s that of movable beauty, which is 
something fundamentally different. Grace is motion 
that acts like an object; it is the Graces acting like 
Venus, dancing acting like standing, time acting like 
stoppage, three acting like one. (Clearly, the phrase 
‘acting like’ begs for an explanation, but we will have 
to save that for the final part.)
In following the same logic for beauty, however, 
we should deviate from Schiller’s labelling of it as 
‘fixed beauty’, as seen in the quote above, an inter-
pretation that fits the traditional, classical notion of 
beauty as timeless, similar to Keats’s ‘slow Time’ in 
‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’. For the writer of On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man, beauty relates directly 
to structure, to standing and stillness; it is the ‘archi-
tectural beauty of the human structure [Bau, literally 
‘build’],’ evidently identified with gravity, serious-
ness and duty. The English word ‘serious’ shares 
its etymological origin with the German Schwer, or 
‘heavy’.38 At first, Schiller performs his extraordinary 
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have mentioned a few times now: that of standing. 
One might think standing was a problem of 
connecting bones together, as one would the posts 
and beams in an architectural structure – that is, a 
problem of compressive forces. But Leonardo finds 
as many muscles and tendons in the human body 
as he does bones, analogous to his interest in the 
pulleys, springs and ropes that fill his notebooks. 
The problem of standing – of ‘equipoise’ as he calls 
it – is as much a question of tension as of compres-
sion. The two must be understood in relation to 
each other and as working in concert. How does 
the human body stand gracefully? If we apply the 
same rule of counterpoint we did earlier, we should 
answer, ‘By standing flexed’, or even ‘By standing 
weakly’. We stand in contrapposto, with the what 
and how of standing in direct contrast. Or, to put 
it in even more aesthetic terms, we do not stand 
in the Doric manner, with our legs apart; we stand 
in the Gothic manner, with our tendons pulling us 
up while our bones hold us down. The opposition 
between motion and stillness that Schiller resolved 
in the domain of ethics in particular had been like-
wise resolved by Leonardo a few centuries earlier in 
aesthetics. For Leonardo, posture is about neither 
the dynamics of dancing nor the stasis of standing. 
No, it is about the activity of standing, the pulling 
and pushing of standing. There is nothing static 
about standing still; ask any dancer how difficult it 
is. Obviously, this implies the need for grace and the 
figure of grace.
In his Treatise on Painting, Leonardo calls it 
‘Grace in the Limbs’, and his advice for draftsmen 
and painters is to ‘let them be easy and pleasing, 
with various turns and twists, and the joints grace-
fully bent, that they may not look like pieces of 
wood.‘43 And not drawing them as pieces of wood 
means paying extra attention to the hinging of the 
joints, and, more importantly, the coordination of all 
the various flexions into a set of what he identifies 
as undulations: 
leaf that filled the eyes of marble statues.41 Beauty 
is charis for still objects. It should be regarded as 
occupying the same middle position as grace, and 
solving the same opposition between still object 
and acting motion, yet in the opposite direction. We 
should never put beauty and grace in a dualistic 
relationship; in fact, they both resolve dualist oppo-
sitions, but in reverse order. Beauty turns into grace, 
and grace turns into beauty. Figuration consists of 
nothing but turns, and turns only.
The attentive reader will have noticed the ellipsis 
leaving a little gap in the Bergson quote, a void we 
should hasten to fill: ‘Beauty, said Leonardo da 
Vinci, is arrested grace’.42 It is a rather awkward 
quote, in a way, since the phrase is nowhere to be 
found in Leonardo’s Treatise on Painting. In fact, 
Bergson’s is an imaginary quote, based on his 
attentive reading of the French philosopher of habit 
and grace, Félix Ravaisson, who we will attend to 
later; but no matter – as a formula, it is as perfect 
as Schiller’s. In the knowledge that Leonardo’s trea-
tise was written in the 1490s, Schiller’s essay in the 
1790s, and Bergson’s lecture in the early 1900s, 
we should acknowledge the consistency of their 
discoveries by terming the reciprocity of beauty and 
grace the ‘Leonardo-Schiller turn’. 
It should not surprise us that Leonardo da Vinci’s 
name enters the discussion; he had many things to 
say on the topic of grace, and we hardly have to 
mention explicitly that he shared Schiller’s interest 
in the ‘beauty of the human structure’. Leonardo’s 
dazzling knowledge of human anatomy is well 
known. Looking at his anatomical drawings, we 
immediately see why his studies are so crucial 
for our argument: the human body is a complex 
network of connective elements. Ligaments, sinews, 
tendons, arteries, bones: it is as if the human body 
itself is a drawing, made up of linear elements inter-
twining in ever-darkening relationships while never 
fully retreating from visibility. This complex network 
led Leonardo to completely rethink the problem we 
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neither drop down from the sky nor rise up from 
the earth – i.e., they are neither produced by mere 
transcendence nor by immanence. Studying the 
historical evolution of charis and grace allows us to 
discern another form of production, something that 
has not fully crystallised yet in our analysis, though 
we can see some of its major aspects emerging. 
The figuring of grace appears to be based on a set 
of complex interactions, what we should perhaps 
call a machinery of workings. The figure seems 
like a machined product that occurs between two 
zones of influence, with (a) on one side, the input of 
a rhythm, of a turning cycle that conveys a constant 
supply of activity without producing specific activi-
ties as yet; a stream that does not in itself produce 
the figure, since for that to occur, the stream needs 
to (b) meet the vertical axis of gravity at the other 
end. It is as if grace relies both on a temporal 
component, a turning wheel, and on a spatial 
component, a standing structure, with the figure 
suddenly appearing in the gap between them, like 
an electrical arc between two poles.
In this sense, grace is definitely a figured line or 
group of lines, and this one-dimensionality is no acci-
dent, because the line is the dimension of the way, 
and the way is as much a trajectory as an object. 
But it does not exist by itself; without its poles, the 
lines are plotted in relation to each other without any 
external regulating device – therefore, it is precar-
ious to formalise the line. We should be careful to 
consider the serpentine line as a ‘line of grace’, 
as the English painter William Hogarth famously 
did in The Analysis of Beauty,46 as a line similar 
to the Mannerist furia della figura as advocated 
by Giovanni Lomazzo, who introduced the term 
figura serpentinata in 1584.47 That said, Hogarth’s 
S-figure shows more internal measure than we 
encounter in the fury of Mannerism, enabling the 
figure to create the large variety of configurational 
groups we find in Hogarth’s work; people gathering 
in the street, dancing in a hall, or discussing poli-
tics at the table are always depicted as intricate 
Consider with the greatest care the form of the outlines 
of every object, and the character of their undulations. 
And these undulations must be separately studied, 
as to whether the curves are composed of arched 
convexities or angular concavities.44 
In the section titled ‘Of Undulating Movements and 
Equipoise’, he adds: ‘When representing a human 
figure or some graceful animal, be careful to avoid 
a wooden stiffness; that is to say, make them move 
with equipoise and balance so as not to look like 
a piece of wood.’45 Now, what exactly are these 
undulations or curves, these lines that appear in 
the figure that later became known as the figura 
serpentinata? 
These are not simply curves liberated from the 
stranglehold of straightness, some trace of freedom 
that has wrested itself away from necessity. What 
could be more naïve than such a view? Again, all 
the figures Leonardo analyses stand; that is, they 
are organised around a vertical axis – and there is 
nothing straighter than the axis of gravity. Something 
far more complex than escape or liberation is going 
on here; rather the opposite: all the curves are 
engaged in actively constructing vertical straight-
ness. The fingers, the hands, the arms, the legs, 
the neck, the spine: all the parts are individually 
mobilised to collectively achieve stillness. Again, we 
are not playing with paradoxes or metaphors here. 
The figure of grace is not some swooshy gesture 
drunkenly sliding over the slippery whiteness of the 
paper but rather a set of curves interrelated by a 
rigorous logic, a configuration organised around an 
invisible internal ruler. It is as if all the bendings of 
the curves cancel each other out against a perfectly 
vertical, but dashed, straight line, allowing the figure 
to stand, and not fall from grace.
To interrupt myself for a moment, figures do not 
seem to sprout from the ground or emerge from a 
background, as figures are commonly presumed to 
do. The type of figures we are investigating here 
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of fruit and flowers set against the dark green back-
ground of a forest – it all makes Primavera appear 
more like a tapestry than a perspectival view of 
volumes in space.49 
Admittedly, declaring one of the highlights of 
neoplatonic artistry to be a Gothic project is pushing 
the argument; doing the same with a neoclassical 
wonder like Canova’s Three Graces borders on 
the hyperbolic. But just look at it: except for the 
fact that it refers to the classics, Canova’s work 
can hardly be termed classicist when compared to 
the deep-frozen stiffs of Ingres or Alberti. Maybe 
the best solution is to phrase things in contra-
puntal terms again: it is using a classicist style to 
do something Gothic. A Gothic end achieved in a 
classical way. Almost all the limbs are in a flexed, 
weakened mode, except for a single leg of each of 
the goddesses, who stand in contrapposto, one leg 
straight and stressed, the other bent and relaxed. 
The glances; the opening of the fingers; the gentle 
placing of hands on shoulders, breast, and cheek; 
the springy ringlets flowing down; the single piece of 
cloth they share; the downcast eyes of Aglaea in the 
middle; her slightly raised position: it is as if there is 
an all-out weakening and softening of all the parts 
that, when they are interlaced, creates this insepa-
rable group, standing as if by magic. In a way, they 
all let go, but instead of collapsing, they find one 
another and stand fast. Strictly speaking, we do not 
see three figures, the Graces, but dozens of figures 
at every scale from fingers to whole bodies, every 
one of them engaged in this single act of collabo-
ration, creating a flexible network in the sense of 
Leonardo’s anatomy: a flexible system of holding, 
touching, pulling and pushing that finds this singular 
figure of grace.
Grace and habit
Describing grace as a machine, then have it 
followed by analyses of art, makes us gradu-
ally realise that art has inexorably steered toward 
an impasse in the channelling of grace. As grace 
sets of nested serpentines. Mannerism hardly ever 
shows such converging entities, only doing so in 
sculptures such as Giambologna’s Rape of the 
Sabine Women – logically, because it is an actual 
statue, in which the problem of standing is inherent. 
Especially in painting, its serpentines operate as 
lines of divergence, of groups being scattered apart. 
It is useful to remember that in Greek mythology 
the anti-Graces were personified by the Erinyes, 
also known as the Furies, figures of purely chthonic 
heritage. Leonardo’s line is, as stated, not one of 
pure movement but one that measures itself against 
the act of standing, a feat we observed likewise in 
Botticelli and Canova. The exceptional quality of 
Botticelli’s depiction of the Graces in Primavera lies 
in the fact that the painting behaves as a drawing. 
Not only do the legs, arms and fingers behave as 
lines; the contours, the tresses of hair, the folds in 
the sheer dresses all exhibit a strong but unusual 
sense of schematics and design. The resulting 
awkwardness is crucial to the work’s quality. Though 
it was surely the reason why Walter Pater called 
Botticelli ‘a secondary painter’, any form of natu-
ralism would have destroyed the work’s power of 
figuration.48 We cannot ‘depict’ grace, because the 
notion of a picture or image goes directly against 
that of a figure. The manifest presence of design 
makes Primavera more a Gothic than a typically 
Renaissance exercise; the latter always empha-
sises the solidity of volume, while the former revels 
in the kind of delicate linework we find in tracery 
and illuminated initials. Even the folds in the fabric, 
which usually seem to emerge from a textile surface, 
seem here to exist on their own, as figures, espe-
cially in the dress of Venus, whom we could easily 
mistake for the Virgin Mary, surrounded as she is by 
a foliate halo set against an arched niche magically 
created by two symmetrical trees in the background. 
When we step back to absorb the work as a whole, 
it becomes increasingly impossible to escape the 
sense of medievalism: the general lack of depth, the 
figures depicted at a similar size, floating on a sea 
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those of life and death as we have discussed them 
in the context of the Charites, the Moirae and the 
Horae – relating grace to habit becomes wholly 
relevant. By way of a quick introduction, let us 
consider a few of the references made by Pierre 
Hadot, who regularly mentions Ravaisson’s notion 
of habit. In The Veil of Isis, for instance, he contex-
tualises Ravaisson in relation to Pascal’s Pensées:
Pascal may have thought of another “habitual” 
movement of nature when he wrote: “Nature acts 
by progress, itus et reditus (going and returning). It 
passes by and returns, then goes further. Then twice 
as little, then more than ever, etc. The flux of the sea 
takes place in this way, and the sun seems to advance 
in this way.”51 
In several of his writings, Hadot also refers to 
Bergson’s imaginary Leonardo quote. In another, 
on Plotinus, he refers to Ravaisson’s linking of habit 
and grace: ‘Life is grace. No one has understood all 
the implications of this Plotinian experience better 
than Ravaisson in his Philosophical Testament. 
Grace, he tells us there, is “eurhythmia”; that is, 
“movement which does well”.’52 
The above quotes create the impression that 
Ravaisson fully equated habit with grace, but this is 
not always obvious. In his early, 1838 work Of Habit, 
Ravaisson compared habit to ‘prevenient grace’, 
that is, to the Christian concept of God’s efficiency, 
enabling humans to act, choose and move.53 Later, 
Ravaisson develops a more complex, distributed 
argument, supported by his interest in Leonardo’s 
serpentine posture and his thirty-year research into 
the Venus de Milo, two cases in which grace appears 
as an actual, standing figure.54 Reading Ravaisson, 
we begin to discern two sides of grace: a habit side 
that enacts the role of the turning wheel, creating 
the flux of activity, and a more aesthetic, graceful 
side that appears at the moment of figuration. At this 
point, the question arises of whether the rhythmic 
wave line of the flux directly and necessarily leads 
became more and more established in the realm of 
the aesthetic, the aesthetic removed itself more and 
more from everyday life. If we wish to live well, it will 
never suffice to punctuate our everyday lives with 
visits to the museum or, for that matter, the church. 
We fundamentally need grace in life itself, at its 
most trivial moments, whether we are driving a car, 
cooking a six-course meal, taking a cup off the shelf 
to pour ourselves some tea, or sitting in a chair. Only 
the conceptual power of the figure explains sitting in 
the chair and getting up from it as a single activity, 
even a single object: still action and mobile action 
share one and the same continuous line. One might 
think this was the most trivial thing in the world, and 
in practice it is, but conceptually it is not. Getting 
up from a chair is as miraculous as a bird leaving 
its nest: there has to be movement before you 
start moving. How is this possible? It can only be 
understood (a) as a movement that is ‘built in’ as an 
inclination or excitation by the architectural Bau of 
the body so admired by Schiller and Leonardo – that 
is, as much by its weakness as by its strength, 
allowing mobility and stillness to coexist – and (b) 
if the act has been executed before, i.e., if the act 
of getting up precedes the sitting in the chair. These 
are the wheels of habit, but also of training, practice 
and imitation. Habit enables grace; doing-well is in 
one way or another dependent on doing-again – on 
recurrence, as mentioned earlier. Yet first and fore-
most, the production of grace takes place in the 
realm of the everyday and the ordinary. 
These observations converge in the work of 
Félix Ravaisson, the nineteenth-century French 
philosopher of habit, and the only philosopher of 
habit who related it to grace as well as to what he 
called Leonardo’s ‘flexuous line’.50 Through contem-
porary eyes, we might view habit as the source of 
boredom, rut and repetition, and no small number 
of philosophers has supported this view, Kant 
included. However, when we think of the habitual 
nature of the cycle – of our everyday activities but 
also of larger cycles, the monthly, the yearly, and 
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namely to find a way to position habit – and subse-
quently inhabitation – conceptually within grace, 
and not the reverse. Our topic is grace, and how it 
appears between habit and inhabitation, or better, 
in the gap between habit and inhabitation. If we 
were to take habit as the starting point for arriving 
at an understanding of its relation to inhabitation, 
the magic or effortlessness of grace would at best 
result as a fortunate outcome, and at worst as a 
product automatically dropped off the end of habit’s 
conveyor belt. It is neither: grace is uncertain and 
undetermined. Grace needs habit, but habit does 
not necessarily lead to grace, and grace therefore 
functions as an end to strive for, be it in our individual 
behaviour or collectively. Figuration, then, should be 
viewed as the goal, and habit as an essential part 
of the ontological machinery for achieving that goal. 
The telos of things is to go well. 
Many of Ravaisson’s constructions support this 
idea, especially because he succeeds in bridging 
numerous concepts like habit, grace, figuration 
and education. By conceptualising grace within 
the framework of habit, he restored some of the 
transcendence that had been lost in the aesthetic 
route that we chose to follow in our brief history 
of grace. On the other hand, it must be said that 
though Ravaisson’s intuition served him well in his 
connection of habit to grace in his early treatise Of 
Habit, a closer reading of his later essays shows 
that, in fact, he came to view the two as continuous. 
In the end, Ravaisson perceived the rhythmic wave 
line of habit as identical to the serpentine line of 
grace, as Hadot indicated. My question would then 
be: How would the past ever flow into the present 
without transformation? That would be impossible; 
the present is by nature situated and therefore 
needs to meet the conditions of verticality along 
with those of rhythm. After all, when the issue arises 
how grace comes into existence, we should realise 
that the word ‘existence’ is derived from the Latin 
for ‘standing’, sistere; a connection we encounter 
likewise in the German Bestehen. Ravaisson 
to the serpentine line of the figure. From the above 
quotations, it is clear that Pierre Hadot viewed 
them as continuous, since he often confounds 
them. We do not require an extensive argument 
to see why they are so different: the wave line is 
fundamentally horizontal, while the figure of grace 
is organised around a vertical, as we have learned 
from Leonardo and Schiller. Habit and grace must 
be strongly related, yes, but they cannot be iden-
tical, since they differ in their connection from one 
to the other. The simple fact remains that we carry 
habits with us, while graceful acts are situated; they 
need to be found. Habits we have; grace we do not.
Here we are peeking a bit ahead in the argument, 
but as an initial sketch it helps us to start filling in 
the picture of the ‘grace machine’ and what we have 
called its two poles. Whereas a few pages back we 
stated that one pole of the machine consisted of a 
temporal wheel and the other of a spatial structure, 
we can now, thanks to Ravaisson, rephrase and 
call the former the pole of habit. In consequence, 
we should term the latter the pole of inhabitation, 
the other half of the grace machine which was of 
no particular interest to Ravaisson. If this distinction 
between the two poles has any validity, it means 
habit does not fit directly into the space of inhabita-
tion, since for poles to work, they need to be apart. 
Needless to say, this goes against our fundamental 
beliefs: how can we trust anything if habit cannot 
rely on the things it surrounds itself with? The two 
poles are separated by a gap, and the machine 
produces the figure of grace to bridge them. But let 
us slow down and return to Ravaisson.
As with Schiller, it is not my aim to offer a detailed 
reading of Ravaisson’s work; there are more than 
enough excellent discussions of both philosophers. 
Instead, we should concentrate on how habit can 
be understood in the framework of grace, and via 
grace, in the context of the ancient concepts of 
charis and the gift cycle. Seen from this viewpoint, 
my project is virtually the opposite of Ravaisson’s, 
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increase of inclination: we act as if we have the wind 
at our backs; the act becomes increasingly easier. If 
nothing else, grace is favour. The second part of the 
argument is far less convincing, if at all. Of course, 
in acting with less effort, we act with reduced 
consciousness but, as grace tells us, with increased 
feeling. Habit may be numbing; grace is not. In fact, 
there seems to be more feeling from the moment 
consciousness stops raising barriers. Just watch a 
person doing something well – say, driving that car 
we mentioned at the beginning, smoothly swerving 
around problems, stopping with foresight, checking 
the rearview mirror and adjusting his or her speed in 
between. Probably the driver will have forgotten the 
whole trip if asked for details afterwards; definitely 
a case of diminished consciousness. But would we 
also say he or she drove with less feeling? No, on 
the contrary, we rarely encounter so much feeling 
and tact. Every detail is absorbed, the minutest 
movement taken up in the activity; it is as if the car is 
surrounded by a halo that registers and processes 
every movement. When one is driving well, every-
thing is networked and coordinated. We can hardly 
tell what is happening inside and what outside. The 
inside of the driver’s body, the interior of the car, 
and the outside events form a single, yet imper-
sonal sphere. 
The driver acts in a state of blessing, similar to 
the effects of the gift: at first bestowed externally, 
the gift is wholly internalised, to be acted out again 
externally. Is the driver ‘transported’, or does the 
halo issue from him or her without meeting any 
obstruction? It is impossible to tell: transcendence 
and immanence make equal claims on the cycle 
by taking turns; that is, one acts as the other. We 
cannot say for sure who acts through whom and 
what acts through what, except that it concerns an 
extreme form of harmonisation – the reason why 
grace has such close ties to beauty. Habit starts 
with effort and moves toward effortlessness, as if 
things are moving by themselves, though such a 
state of grace would be impossible to find without 
became convinced that the serpentine line in itself 
was enough to display the presence of grace. This 
is most apparent when, in his essays, he merrily 
switches back and forth between descriptions of 
Leonardo’s and Michelangelo’s respective uses of 
the S-figure, unaware of the yawning gap that sepa-
rates the two Florentine masters on this score.55 
For Michelangelo, the serpentine line is a freely 
swerving figure that acts as if liberating itself from 
the weight of the marble block, while completely 
dependent on its structure to exist. He therefore 
operates fully within the classic opposition of grace 
and gravity, while Leonardo’s concept of grace aims 
to dissolve that dualism by including gravity in the 
figure. As we saw earlier, for Leonardo, the serpen-
tine figure is a way of standing: the swerving curve 
and the dashed perpendicular merge in a single, 
noncontradictory structure of grace.56 Though he 
was a fervent student of Leonardo’s work – and the 
Venus de Milo – Ravaisson did not recognise that 
dashed vertical, a line that for us plays an essential 
role in structuring inhabitation.57 Grace is not some 
angelic curve freeing itself from gravity like a plume 
of smoke; no, it finds standing; as an instance 
of contrapposto it demonstrates how measured 
freedom allows us to find a stance. Evidently, that is 
what instantiation means.
Nevertheless, it cannot be emphasised enough 
that Ravaisson touched the heart of the matter by 
connecting habit and grace. Regardless how we 
define grace, it involves a movement that exceeds 
its agent, and such excess can only be supplied by 
habit. Ravaisson, in another way of saying that this 
movement is larger than us, writes of the ‘effacing 
of effort’: our actions become more and more effort-
less, as if carried by a greater force.58 According to 
many philosophers of habit, including Ravaisson, 
habit is based on the fact that at the moment we 
reach a certain level of effortlessness, the inclination 
to repeat the act increases, while at the same time, 
the feelings that accompany the act decrease.59 
In the framework of grace, we can appreciate the 
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movement, and the act of liberality characteristic of 
divine goodness: the two meanings of the word grace 
were identical for Ravaisson.60 
To be sure, the two meanings of grace are synon-
ymous, not because of etymology but precisely 
because of what Bergson points at by using the 
language of gift exchange, implying the cycle is 
nothing but an exchange of generosity. A ‘move-
ment recorded by a form’ is met by a moving form. 
Thus, grace cannot be reduced to its relationship 
with habit and must be consistently analysed as 
part of the gift cycle.
When we apply this model to driving a car, the 
question arises: Which of the two is actually moving, 
us or the car? We are sitting still in the driver’s seat, 
changing the form of our bodies by moving our 
limbs. The car, however, is not changing its form at 
all but moving at high speed. Where is the actual 
exchange taking place? In this sense, driving a car 
is the opposite of riding a horse. When we ride, we 
become the immobile torso, and the horse acts as 
the limbs; in the case of driving, we are the limbs 
and the car the torso, in what is essentially a form 
of harnessing. We and the car are both built – that 
is, structures in the sense of Schiller’s Bau. We 
both have a build inasmuch as we have been built 
in a certain way, with an architecture of still and 
mobile parts. Again and again, Schiller speaks of 
the ‘technology of the human structure’, die Technik 
des menschlichen Baues.61 Obviously, the car has 
been built according to our build. Our way of driving 
adapts to the car, and the car has been adapted 
to our way of driving. In terms of the gift cycle, we 
might have a gift for driving, so to speak, but that gift 
is partially substantiated by the car; the car enables 
us to drive. We drive thanks to the car, but the car 
does not drive itself through us; it is a gift we have 
to receive, and which we try to return by increase, 
by driving well. The Graces are ‘givers of increase’, 
as Jane Harrison said. 
the expansion of feeling. It is certainly correct to say 
that with increased effortlessness the act liberates 
itself from its subject, but not from feeling. As stated 
earlier, in the gift cycle we don’t own our feelings. 
The inclination is not merely to drive, or a liking to 
drive, but to drive well. Habit transforms the first step 
into the second, the skill of driving into the pleasure 
of driving; and grace transforms the pleasure of 
driving into driving-well. Habit is the run-up to the 
jump of grace. It explains forwardness, but grace 
explains towardness.
A disturbing question creeps into the mind. Is 
there any correspondence between the ongoing 
example of driving as finding grace and the descrip-
tion of grace as a machine? In short, yes, but the 
longer answer is: not in the way we might think. 
Though it is a machine, grace is never an assured 
outcome. While habit is surely part of its mecha-
nism, we are looking at a machinery that runs on 
certainty in one direction and on uncertainty in the 
other. From grace to habit, the machine’s workings 
are determined; from habit to grace, they are not. 
Never will it be certain that doing-again will result 
in doing-well; the machine does not produce grace 
as a commodity. Every time we act, we add speed 
to the turning wheel of habit, and thus to the tran-
scendence of grace; however, grace given is not the 
same thing as grace received, and definitely not the 
same thing as grace returned. 
Let us go back for a moment to Bergson’s essay, 
to the point where he rephrases Ravaisson’s ideas 
in terms of the gift cycle: 
Thus, for him who contemplates the universe with the 
eye of an artist, it is grace that is apprehended through 
the veil of beauty, and beneath grace it is goodness 
which shines through. Each thing manifests, in the 
movement recorded by its form, the infinite generosity 
of a principle which gives itself. And it is not by mistake 
that we call by the same name the charm we see in 
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the early, Aristotelian Ravaisson, who was deeply 
influenced by the concepts of potential and actual 
movement. Potential movement does not simply 
lie stored in the darkness of our own bodies; it 
emanates from the things around us as well, visibly 
and actually, in what we have been calling a halo 
and what Bergson described as a ‘veil of beauty’, 
and beauty is wholly indeterminate.63
Here the argument turns sharply against ergo-
nomics: the more that things and we adapt to one 
another, the less movement there will be. Fully 
adapted to us, the car will drive itself, and we will 
merely sit there being passengers. The whole 
secret of the gift cycle lies in the fact that the figure 
of grace cannot be appropriated, neither by us nor 
by the things around us. To drive well, or better, to 
live well, we need between us and things a certain 
gap: a word that slowly starts to take a central posi-
tion in our discussion. We and things do not – and 
should not – fit, for it is in the gap between habit 
and inhabitation that the figure appears. However, 
determining that gap is a most subtle affair: if 
there is a perfect fit, the figure disappears, but if 
the gap grows too large, the figure disappears as 
well. Somewhere there exists a middle, though not 
merely between us and things but also between us 
and our habits. The gap is a double gap, existing on 
both sides of the middle: a graceful act can neither 
be produced by habit’s repetition nor by the things 
around us. This, of course, is the reason why the 
figure’s appearance is never certain. The whole art 
of doing-well, of grace, is jumping the gap between 
habit and inhabitation.
The word ‘habit’ evolved from the Proto-Indo-
European root ghabh, which means ‘to give, to 
receive’, as well as the Sanskrit gabhasti, meaning 
‘hand’ or ‘forearm’, both of which converge in the 
Latin habere, which means ‘to have, to hold, wear, 
etc.’ The contrapuntal ambiguity of having and 
giving expresses how habit and grace are firmly 
Critics of technology have regularly advanced the 
argument that as we drive we are driven, that the 
car defines our behaviour as much as we define its 
behaviour, as if the machine turns us into a machine 
as well. Such co-determinism is precisely not what 
gift exchange entails: the gift does not define what 
the receiver does with the gift; it gives in such a 
manner that the receiver can become a returner. 
Instrumentality and purposiveness are never, and 
never will be, able to explain the nature of tech-
nology. The gift implicitly carries a sense of the 
indeterminate or surplus. Certainly, while driving we 
have a goal in mind, and likewise while hammering 
or typing, but if these technologies did not allow 
or again, enable swerving and manoeuvring, we 
would never be able to find our way. And as to the 
word ‘enable’, we should note that its etymology 
wholly coincides with that of ‘inhabit’, in habilis. 
Technology – that which is built – needs to reach 
beyond its purpose. Or, to phrase it in the religious 
terms of transcendence we used earlier, the car’s 
build exudes a halo of movement, which by expan-
sion turns into the halo of driving. The technology 
of the car’s Bau is a form of enabling – that is, of 
empowering, not of defining. In this sense, we do 
not inhabit the car when we drive; the car inhabits 
us, exactly as the gift cycle’s second stage of inter-
nalisation prescribes, to then make us expand and 
grow. Grace exceeds every notion of instrumental 
use or the ‘least expenditure of force’, as Herbert 
Spencer defined grace.62 
The things around us – and all things are built 
things – do not passively await our gracious 
handling; there is as much generosity in them as 
there is in us. The movement we actualise is not 
just the movement stored in our own bodies by the 
rhythms of habituation. The gift cycle is, first and 
foremost, driven by the Leonardo-Schiller turn: still-
ness into movement (beauty), and movement into 
stillness (grace). In short, it will not suffice to explain 
the relationship between habit and grace in terms of 
24
must act seriously, and that to do our duty we should 
act as if we were playing. These remarks contain a 
few words that have been used increasingly often 
throughout our argument and should now be given 
our full attention: ‘play’, ‘act’, ‘act like’, and ‘as if’. 
What kind of play does this involve? Again, many 
clues are given by Schiller – someone at least as 
interested in freedom, grace and education as 
Ravaisson – the idea of play is central to his On 
the Aesthetic Education of Man. Initially borrowing 
it from Kant’s remarks on the ‘free play of the imagi-
nation’,66 he slowly transformed it into the ‘play 
drive’,67 Spieltrieb, which is as much driven by the 
Bau of the body as by the mind’s urge for freedom:
Freedom now rules beauty. Nature provided beauty 
of form [Bau], the soul provides the beauty of play. 
Now we also know what grace is. Grace is beauty of 
form under freedom’s influence, the beauty of those 
appearances that the person determines.68 
Schiller does not mistake grace for freedom. On 
the contrary, grace is the equation of frame and 
freedom, and that can only be solved via the contra-
puntal figure, which fundamentally determines that 
freedom is to be found only under strict conditions, 
yet necessarily strict in the most abstract sense, 
as if the Bau could be schematised, similar to the 
ghosted presence of the vertical axis in contrap-
posto. Evidently, if the strictness were concrete, it 
would not be able to generate freedom and spon-
taneity. Every architect knows we cannot build 
freedom, though the opposite is just as true: freedom 
cannot be found in the unobstructed absence of 
structure. How to solve this? Only by ghosting the 
frame. Play cannot exist without the ghosted frame, 
and when we look at the playing of games in sports, 
of roles in customs, or of parts in the theatre, we see 
this confirmed in many ways. Strict rules define the 
game, and sharply defined limits define the playing 
field. Yet these limits are painted on the ground in 
the form of dashed or continuous lines, and never 
rooted in the gift cycle – logically, since the cycle 
itself is based on the ambiguity of a property that 
is owned and a gift that is dispensed. If it were only 
owned, it could not be shared; if it were purely given 
away, it would never be returned. Ambiguity causes 
the gift to be returned, although, as mentioned 
before, the return of the gift makes ‘ambiguity’ the 
wrong term, since grace does not involve some 
passive, linguistic state of vagueness, contradiction 
or paradox but rather an active turn in need of being 
worked out, both in the present and as present. 
Giving means being given; handling means being 
handed. It is indeed, as Ravaisson says ‘a law, a 
law of the limbs, which follows on from the freedom 
of spirit. But this law is a law of grace.’64 And this can 
only be true because the law of the limbs is the law 
of the gift cycle, of the Graces. The law of the limbs 
is by no means a law of an established form of ease 
or a formalisation of ease, of what the French would 
call souplesse and the Germans Gelenkigkeit, 
since you neither fully have it nor is it fully given 
to you.65 If it were given in advance, it would erode 
into comfort, the dream of ergonomics, which would 
make the whole cycle irrelevant. Again, technology 
reveals its deeply religious vocation; relieving us 
from burden and providing us with such ease of 
movement we can hardly distinguish between the 
religious comfort of solace and the technological 
comfort of appliances. But each works only when 
it stops short and acknowledges the necessity of 
the gap. Given too much comfort, we might as well 
disappear altogether. If, on the other hand, we were 
to claim grace as our property, as something we had 
and controlled as our own, it would degrade into 
slickness or virtuosity. Ease does not sprout from 
easiness: ease sprouts from difficulty. This is the 
law of the limbs, which is also the rule of counter-
point that lies at the heart of the Leonardo-Schiller 
turn. 
Grace and play
At the very beginning of our essay, the notion of 
counterpoint led us to posit that play means we 
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of us and our bodily structures. Even when focusing 
on ourselves, as athletes often do, we imitate 
models and imagine opponents. Along with military 
drill, athletic training is the most extreme form of 
habituation we know, with its endless repetition of 
every movement, the constant attempts to improve, 
the difficulties and injuries to overcome, the stamina 
and extreme effort needed to persevere. One might 
think sports training and military drill would be the 
last places one should expect to encounter grace, 
but in ancient Greece – where else? – military exer-
cise was viewed as a powerful source of charis. 
Herodotus reports on a scout spying on the Spartan 
army: ‘He saw some of the men exercising naked 
and others combing their hair. He marvelled at the 
sight and took note of their numbers. When he had 
observed it all he rode back … and told Xerxes all 
that he had seen.’71
Naked exercising is one thing, but soldiers 
collectively combing their hair just before a deadly 
battle? It sounds as if the Spartans had the perfect 
understanding of beauty. Beauty and grace play a 
central, yet covert, role in sports as well. As David 
Foster Wallace observed in his celebrated article on 
tennis player Roger Federer, ‘Of course, in men’s 
sports no one ever talks about beauty or grace or 
the body.’72 Yet grace is undeniably part of it, as the 
celebrated author shows in the following segment 
of the same article, in which he ponders the roles 
of movement, feeling, training, and consciousness. 
Reading Wallace on tennis is like checking off items 
on a list of aspects of habit and grace drawn up by 
Ravaisson: 
Successfully returning a hard-served tennis ball 
requires what’s sometimes called “the kinesthetic 
sense,” meaning the ability to control the body and 
its artificial extensions through complex and very 
quick systems of tasks. English has a whole cloud of 
terms for various parts of this ability: feel, touch, form, 
proprioception, coordination, hand-eye coordina-
tion, kinesthesia, grace, control, reflexes, and so on. 
materialised by walls or fences. Limits are real 
but abstract, and at the same time strict but open, 
and more part of a world of rules than of laws, as 
Baudrillard would put it.69
Since turns and counterpoints fundamentally 
govern the playing of games, roles, and parts, play 
must rely on habit as well as being embedded in 
the machinery of grace. To properly understand how 
the different varieties of sport, custom, and theatre 
relate to our research into grace, habit and inhabita-
tion, we will surely need more than this essay. For 
now, however, to complete our sketch of the grace 
machine, we should look into a few of their aspects.
In sports, we easily find dozens of connections 
to grace, habit and even charis – the references in 
Pindar’s Olympian Odes to the charis of athletes 
are numerous. Everything seems connected to 
our discussion of grace and habit: the relentless 
practicing of moves during training, the admira-
tion brought on by striving, the searching for ease 
without strain, the grace of the figures with respect to 
posture, the uncertainty whether things will work out 
in the actual game, and the shining of the winners. 
Though habit concerns ordinary activity and training 
extraordinary activity, we should consider the two 
continuous and based on the same principles. 
Training in sports evolved from military drill, and 
some sports still show direct links to a military past, 
such as the javelin throw, boxing, judo and archery. 
In its relation to habituation, training is comparable to 
acquiring customs in social roles, and to rehearsing 
a part for the stage. We should keep in mind that 
customs are akin to costumes; we can put them on 
and take them off, in exactly the way Venus used the 
girdle of the Graces, according to Schiller.70 Training 
requires enormous effort and the meticulous control 
of actions, which are without exception based on 
imitation, whether it concerns roles in the theatre or 
the social roles of customs. The fact that mimesis is 
one of the mechanisms in the complex machinery 
gives us a clear hint that habit is not merely a matter 
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these movements are without question real because 
they are graceful, and graceful because they are 
figural. Sports continuously supplies us with thou-
sands and thousands of figures. The fact that these 
movements have the status of figures – and in our 
terminology, that means they act as objects – can 
be seen in a wide range of different phenomena. 
The most intriguing demonstration of this effect can 
be observed in the obsessive live replays during 
games and races on television that seem to grind 
time to a halt. We can see it even more clearly in the 
slow-motion replays of the most figural actions. No 
question that slow motion is one of the most original 
inventions in the world of technical imagery. Slow 
motion literally shows movement turning into still-
ness, and in that turn we recognise grace, not in 
either one separately. It is like seeing Keats’s slow 
time converge onto an object instead of emanating 
from it. Mere freeze-framing would fail to present us 
with the figure. Not one of these figural moves is 
certain; an athlete may train for a specific move and 
never find a way to use it, and he or she may come 
up with a completely new move during a game. 
The fact that play, movement, training and grace 
occur in such an intricate web of workings becomes 
even more apparent in the lengthy argument of 
Plato’s Laws, the book that was so important to 
Schiller as he was writing ‘On Grace and Dignity’. 
Perhaps because it was the Greek philosopher’s 
last book, it seems to have been written by a thinker 
who has mellowed slightly. Having come out as 
the sworn enemy of mimesis in The Republic, in 
which he noted how essential imitation was in mili-
tary training,74 Plato now arrives at the view that 
dance is a necessary core activity within education 
(paideia) and essential to the successful building of 
any city-state. Schiller based both ‘On Grace and 
Dignity’ and On the Aesthetic Education of Man on 
the similar assumption that moral rectitude may be 
accompanied by aesthetic pleasure, especially in 
the context of education. There is a long section in 
the Laws in which Plato explains how the Athenians 
For promising junior players, refining the kinesthetic 
sense is the main goal of the extreme daily practice 
regimens we often hear about. The training here is 
both muscular and neurological. Hitting thousands 
of strokes, day after day, develops the ability to do 
by “feel” what cannot be done by regular conscious 
thought. Repetitive practice like this often looks tedious 
or even cruel to an outsider, but the outsider can’t feel 
what’s going on inside the player – tiny adjustments, 
over and over, and a sense of each change’s effects 
that gets more and more acute even as it recedes from 
normal consciousness.73
There must be innumerable reasons why the world 
of sports has become our chief source of figures 
of grace, having taken over this role from the arts, 
and sculpture in particular. Just thinking of the top 
four sculptures of all time – the Laocoön, Cellini’s 
Perseus, Canova’s Three Graces, and Rodin’s 
Balzac – we realise that absolutely nothing today 
reminds us of such postural art, except sports. 
One of the reasons might be that sports in fact 
co-emerged with technology; the two seem like 
conjoined twins. Another reason might be the arts’ 
constant suffering under the metaphysical division 
of appearance and reality. In the arts, mimesis 
remains a hopelessly unresolved issue, while in 
sports, it is simply embedded in the mechanism of 
finding grace. In sports – as in custom, theatre and 
fashion – mimesis belongs to the domain of the real, 
not of illusion. Mimesis is wholly part of the onto-
logical machinery of figuration, wherever it occurs, 
stabilising the turning wheel of habit and training. 
When Federer hits his forehand or a football 
player makes an incredible move, when a volley-
ball player hits a smash or a high jumper throws his 
back over the bar, when an alpine skier performs a 
slalom or Valentino Rossi takes a bend on his motor-
cycle – lying on his bike like a huge frog – or when a 
diver jumps off the springboard, a gymnast performs 
a somersault, a boxer strikes a right blow, a skater 
does a pirouette, or a judoka makes a back throw, 
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mimesis, we have slowly developed a clearer picture 
of how the machine of grace is constructed, and 
before we tie up the argument, we should redirect 
it toward the larger issue of habit and inhabitation, 
the two poles of the machine. By looking at dance, 
art, sports, and play, we have enhanced our under-
standing of the path between habit and grace, the 
temporal pole of the machine. We have seen how 
the route from grace to habit, backwards in time 
toward memory, is assured by training and incor-
poration. We have also seen that the path forward 
in time, that of the production of grace out of habit, 
is not assured, and in this sense, the distance 
between habit and grace is part of the larger gap 
between habit and inhabitation. 
But we have only occasionally been able to 
elaborate on the spatial side of the gap. Looking at 
sports has shown us that space itself contains such 
a gap. Indeed, space is broken, or, if you will, polar-
ised. What we have called the pole of inhabitation 
is itself split in two. Sports, because of its intrinsic 
reliance on figuration, thrives on this dichotomy and 
takes place in the most radical manifestation of the 
gap possible, between pure field and pure object. In 
no way do the two fit together. Games are played 
on highly schematised fields, abstract surfaces we 
encounter in every type of game: boards, tracks, 
courses, arenas, pools, rinks, rings – surfaces that 
are geometrically divided by lines to create boxes, 
halves, bands, circles, corners, squares. A simplified 
geometry is inscribed on a highly abstract, smooth 
surface, not altogether different from the extreme 
abstraction of the highway’s asphalt and striping. 
Invariably, these are surfaces of speed, rhythm and 
movement; there hardly exist more radical exam-
ples of space taking on the properties of a drawing 
or diagram. They are even more abstract than plans, 
and more like schemes. Still, the field is just one half 
of what defines the realm of games. The other half 
consists of its antipode, namely concrete objects: 
sticks, bats, bows, hurdles; vehicles such as boats, 
cars, and motorbikes; and of course dozens of 
teach rhythmic movement to their children ‘as by a 
tonic, when they are moved by any kind of shaking 
or motion, whether they are moved by their own 
action – as in a swing or in a rowing-boat – or are 
carried along on horseback or by any other rapidly 
moving bodies’.75 Rocking babies as part of teaching 
the law of the limbs! Motion administered ‘as by a 
tonic’! Rhythm is ‘taken in’, absorbed, or – as we put 
it earlier when discussing Euphrosyne – swallowed, 
and returned beyond its sphere, in the realm of 
Thalia, as bloom and growth, or, in Plato’s words, in 
a child’s upbringing. This leads Plato to advocate a 
structured programme of training citizens through a 
set of dance routines that differ for each age group. 
And Plato goes further, especially with respect to 
paideia (play) and its connection to choros (dance): 
It is the life of peace that everyone should live as 
much and as well as he can. What then is the right 
way? We should live out our lives playing at certain 
pastimes – sacrificing, singing and dancing – so as to 
be able to win Heaven’s favor and to repel our foes 
and vanquish them in fight.76 
‘Live as well as he can’ – practically the first 
sentence of our essay. For the older Plato, dance, 
grace, training, education, and the appreciation of 
laws are so interconnected that he permits himself a 
wordplay on choros and charis77 and even relates joy 
to mimesis.78 Perhaps Kant, who stated that ‘imita-
tion has no place in morality’, should have studied 
the Greek philosopher more thoroughly.79 In this 
sense, Plato’s ideas even go beyond Schiller’s and 
Ravaisson’s, because the coupling of moral stance 
and aesthetic pleasure, viewed in the framework of 
charis, becomes a cyclical argument. Plato’s advo-
cacy of collective dancing – during festivals that 
recur every two weeks, no less – would make it an 
activity shared by the whole community, doubtless 
inspired by the dancing Graces. 
With the complex affinities between the various 
concepts of grace, charis, habit, training, play, and 
28
Schwarzenberger, Die Grazien (Bonn: Habelt Verlag, 
1966), 58.
3. Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for 
Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W.D. Halls 
(London: Routledge, 1990), 3.
4. Ibid., vii, 16–18.
5. Ibid., 43.
6. Ibid., 14. And: Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics 
(New York: De Gruyter, 1972), Chapter 7, ‘The Spirit of 
the Gift’, 149–84.
7. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel 
Mauss, as quoted in Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 
154: ‘Are we not dealing with a mystification?’ And: 
Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, 
trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 10: ‘Why and how can I think that the 
gift is impossible?’ Derrida argues that the notion of 
excess excludes the possibility of return. Mauss’s 
argument, in stark contrast, is precisely that the return 
is enabled because of surplus, which is the whole 
reason why we cannot reduce it to mere economy.
8. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 191–96. And: 
Marcel Hénaff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money, and 
Philosophy, trans. J.-L. Morhange (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 248.
9. See, for instance: Nurit Bird-David, ‘“Animism” 
Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational 







15. See: Bonnie MacLachlan, The Age of Grace 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
16. I introduce the term ‘superactual’ in: ‘Charis and 
Radiance’, Giving and Taking: Antidotes to a Culture of 
Greed, ed. J. Brouwer and S. van Tuinen (Rotterdam: 
V2_Publishing, 2014), 136–47.
17. Mauss, The Gift, 39–43.
18. Ibid., 3.
19. Iliad 18.382.
types of balls: big, small, hard, soft, perfectly round, 
round and flat, and not quite round. Nothing tells the 
ball where to go on the field, except figuration. The 
figures we encounter in sports should be consist-
ently examined as bridging-jumping between 
abstract surfaces and concrete objects.
This complex machinery of grace, of which sports 
is merely the most radical form, structures nothing 
less than our whole lives (and, I would add, those 
of all other things, but let us leave that for now). 
We cannot inhabit space directly with our habits. 
Undeniably, an enormous danger for architects, 
designers and engineers lurks in the idea that we 
can. Habit and inhabitation do not fit together like a 
hand and a glove; they are necessarily separated 
by a gap, a double gap with two sides: a horizontal, 
temporal side that ejects figures of grace that can 
only appear on the other, spatial side of the gap, 
itself structured as a vertical gap between abstract, 
smooth fields and concrete, contoured objects. 
Oddly enough, all the parts of what we have called 
the grace machine can be clearly defined and 
described – the wheel of habit and training; the 
rhythms it produces being spatially reflected in the 
abstract field; the existence of concrete objects, lifted 
from the field over the vertical axis of gravity – but 
not grace itself. Being wholly dependent on work-
ings, it can never be assured of whether the 
machine works. Indeed, this radical uncertainty is 
the whole reason for its existence; it is a machine 
with a fundamental question mark at its heart.
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